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Iran’s Revolutionary Guards used a United Arab Emirates-based procurement network to buy advanced Chinese satellite equipment linked to its drone programme, according to records seen by the FT.
The deal is highly sensitive because it shows the Gulf state hosted a company supplying communications kit to the same branch of the guards that launched missiles at the UAE in response to US-Israeli strikes.
Leaked UAE commercial contracts and shipping records show how the IRGC’s Aerospace Force acquired the military-grade Chinese satellite communication technology in late 2025 through a UAE-based company.
The UAE bore the brunt of Iran’s retaliation to the US-Israeli assault, with the Islamic republic firing more than 2,800 drones and missiles at the Gulf state, including at civilian targets.
Despite Abu Dhabi’s hawkish stance towards the Islamic republic, before the war the UAE had traditionally been a centre for Iranian businesses operating offshore.
As it has become the region’s dominant trade hub over the past two decades, the UAE’s various emirates established free zones where supervision of trade is less effective, analysts say, fuelling concerns that they can be exploited for illicit trade and sanctions busting.
The equipment for the guards was routed through Telesun, located in the emirate of Ras al Khaimah. The company arranged for the shipment of roughly 1.8 tonnes of Chinese-made satellite antenna equipment from Shanghai to Iran, via the Jebel Ali container port in Dubai.
FT analysis of satellite imagery and shipping location data has found that an Iranian ship that was used for the final leg of the delivery in November broadcast false navigational information about itself to other ships in an effort to disguise the fact that it ever travelled to Iran.
Together, the documents and shipping analysis reveal how the IRGC continued to draw on commercial networks in the UAE to acquire strategically sensitive communications technology even after western sanctions targeted its military procurement apparatus.
The IRGC later used these capabilities in attacks that severely damaged US military bases around the Middle East, killed 13 US service personnel and left hundreds injured. The UAE has borne the brunt of Iran’s retaliation to the US-Israeli assault, with the Islamic republic firing more than 2,800 drones and missiles at the Gulf state.
UAE invoices, packing lists and ocean freight records seen by the FT show that Telesun arranged delivery of a Chinese-made 4.5-metre motorised satellite antenna manufactured by StarWin to be sent from Shanghai to the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas aboard the vessel Zhong Gu Yin Chuan.
FT analysis has confirmed that the Zhong Gu Yin Chuan, a Chinese container ship, arrived from Shanghai into Dubai at the Jebel Ali Container Terminal 1 on August 28. Documents seen by the FT state that it left a container in the port that was collected by the Rama III, an Iranian ship, which called at the same quayside on November 23.
The Rama III then set off a day later. According to GPS signals broadcast from the ship, it sailed out of the Gulf before taking a brief pause off the coast of Oman.
But satellite imagery taken on November 25 reveals the vessel was not at its reported position. This suggests that the ship was “spoofing” — sending out false position reports to neighbouring ships in an effort to disguise its movements.
On November 29, a vessel of the same size, colour and shape as the Rama III appears in satellite pictures in Iran’s Shahid Rajaee port in Bandar Abbas.
This is the port named in the documents seen by the FT as the delivery destination for the consignment.
The shipment — dated October 2025 and described in customs documents as “antenna and accessories” — weighed nearly 1.8 tonnes. It arrived in six cases and was consigned to Ertebatat Faragostar Kish (EFK) in Iran.
According to a contract seen by the FT, Telesun acquired the Chinese equipment on behalf of EFK, an Iranian telecommunications company working on a project for Saman Industrial Group, another Iranian group.
The US Treasury sanctioned Saman in December 2023. It said the company “serves as a commercial front company” for the Aerospace Force Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization, the research and development arm of the guards’ ballistic missile, electronic warfare and drone programmes. EFK is not under any western sanctions.
The US also alleged that Saman helped the guards acquire drone-related equipment through intermediary companies spanning multiple jurisdictions, including antennas, servomotors and other “UAV-applicable items”. The EU has separately sanctioned the Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization, and said it has provided Iranian drones to Russia.
Telesun describes itself as a UAE-based provider of fixed and mobile satellite communications systems across the Middle East and North Africa, offering services from “design to installation & commissioning”.
Telesun did not respond to questions from the FT. The UAE foreign ministry and Iranian embassy in London did not respond.
The shipping agent in Iran was Blue Calm Marine Services, according to the bill of lading. Blue Calm was sanctioned by the US in 2023 for facilitating shipments for a company that provided parts to develop missile propellant to the Iranian defence ministry.
Last month the FT reported that the guards’ Aerospace Force had secretly acquired a satellite — launched by the Chinese company The Earth Eye — that it used to monitor US military bases and Gulf infrastructure before attacks in March.
Earlier this month, the US sanctioned The Earth Eye for supporting Iranian military operations. “The United States will continue to take action to hold China-based entities accountable for their support to Iran,” the State Department said. “The targeting of US service members and partners will not go unanswered.”
Cartography by Ryo Namiki
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