Why Iran fears a deal today means more war tomorrow

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The writer is a professor at Johns Hopkins University and author of ‘Iran’s Grand Strategy’

President Donald Trump hopes a deal will soon end the war with Iran and open the Strait of Hormuz. But a growing chorus of US politicians and pundits have denounced any agreement that gives Iran billions while leaving it in control of the strait and a nuclear programme.

Iran, meanwhile, is in no hurry to jump at the offer. American officials blame Tehran’s obduracy on its fractured leadership. But if there is division in Tehran, it is over the wisdom of trusting the US government. After all, Iran has had a sordid experience of dealmaking with Trump, who scuttled the 2015 nuclear deal and has twice launched strikes against Iran during negotiations.

Iran is driving a hard bargain because this is an existential fight. What it seeks above all else is the guarantee that war will not return. That assurance will have to be embedded in the structure of any deal. The agreement currently on the table — a short-term ceasefire to set the stage for negotiating a larger deal — does not provide it.

The dominant view shared across the political spectrum in Tehran is that, given Trump’s record, the promise of diplomacy could actually raise the threat of war. Washington’s seemingly generous concessions are interpreted as too good to be true. Their aim is to lull Iran into lowering its guard as America prepares to finish the job.

Talk of US strategic defeat in Washington — which is widely discussed in Tehran — has not helped. Analysts in Iran have interpreted such commentary as a clarion call for more war. In their view, the US will not tolerate defeat, and the more that prominent Americans highlight Trump’s failings, the more likely it is that the US will seek to reverse the outcome of this war by waging another. Tehran suspects that the US seeks not a lasting peace but a free hand to keep Iran isolated and weak, checking its nuclear and missile activities by periodically “mowing the lawn”. Faced with such a prospect, deterrence is all that matters. And Iran is seeking it on three fronts: Hormuz, the nuclear file and by making America pay a price.

Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps and its allies believe the heavy cost of war is the only true deterrent to another attack. The war has so far cost the US $29bn and 13 American lives. Even greater has been the cost to the global economy. Trump has so far dismissed this, saying “short-term pain” is “OK” if it means denying Iran nuclear weapons. As the Guards see it, changing Trump’s calculus by inflicting more pain on the US and the world economy is the only way to ensure the US president is ready for serious talks.

Not everyone in Tehran subscribes to this aggressive approach. Iran itself is paying a considerable price. Other Iranian leaders talk of control of the Strait of Hormuz and maintaining Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium as the key to deterrence instead. They believe any durable deal that includes economic compensation for war damage and lasting sanctions relief would hinge on these two issues; the US is demanding that Iran concede on both. This makes striking a lasting deal highly unlikely.

Tehran might agree to open the strait, but it will not relinquish control of it. Iran is now convinced that its ability to shut down this chokepoint is a major deterrent, especially if Yemen’s Houthis join Iran in a future conflict and also squeeze trade through the Red Sea. In addition, control of the strait would let Iran collect fees on commercial maritime traffic. The revenue will be welcome economic relief, but also compel countries around the world to challenge US secondary sanctions by paying Iran tolls. If that happens often enough, it will weaken the sanctions regime.

Iran no longer sees a nuclear deal with the US as a solution to its economic and security problems. It thinks America is unlikely to lift sanctions and that, once Iran has done its part, Trump could again abandon it. Nor would a nuclear deal reduce the likelihood of war. In fact, the emerging consensus in Tehran is that a new nuclear deal aims to give Washington a freer hand to isolate Iran and attack it militarily. Giving the US what it could not get through two wars will not make Iran safer, but more vulnerable. A narrative promoted by the Guards holds that the US only agreed to a ceasefire and talks after it failed to snatch Iran’s highly enriched uranium under cover of rescuing a missing pilot.

The more the US insists on Iran giving up enrichment and handing over its stockpile, the more Tehran becomes convinced that America’s aim is to remove Iran’s deterrence through diplomacy so it can go back to war against a weaker adversary. Iran might agree to suspend enrichment for a period, but its leaders are adamant that concessions must be reversible. By keeping control over its enriched uranium stockpile, albeit diluted, Iran would be able to resume enrichment and thus be only weeks away from nuclear breakout. Only by building that option into the deal, Iranian officials argue, can it dissuade the US from returning to war.

The US and Iran may agree to end this round of fighting. That would be welcome news for the world economy, but we should not be distracted by any short-term gains or Trump’s inevitable claims of victory and the dawn of a new era in the Middle East. A larger, lasting deal to address the future of Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear programme will be far more difficult to attain.