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The writer is director of regional security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies
When Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney visited Saudi Arabia earlier this month, he must have commiserated with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman about the travails of middle powers in an age of US unpredictability. For Canada, a relationship based on trade, human and cultural proximity and a sense of shared values and destiny is now jeopardised by the Trump administration’s predatory rhetoric. For Saudi Arabia, values-free relations built on security and investment are now compromised by reckless US behaviour in its neighbourhood.
Having advised against the US-Israel war with Iran, Riyadh and other Gulf states must now contend with its destabilising consequences. They begrudgingly accept that the unnerving cycle of war, economic coercion and diplomacy will dictate their geopolitical and geoeconomic conduct for years to come.
Saudi Arabia has been a relative winner from an otherwise damaging war. Its officials have worked assiduously to rebuke Iran, counter Israeli influence in western capitals and present off-ramps to the conflict. In 2026, the Saudi economy is still projected to grow by 1.7 per cent according to the IMF. This, of course, presumes that conditions will not worsen — a brave assumption to hold in the Middle East.
Officials in Riyadh know better. Having spent years trying to avoid a regional conflagration, they now watch with dread as America and Iran engage in renewed brinkmanship. The very ambiguous June memorandum of understanding focused on reopening the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear programme. For the Gulf states, Tehran’s arsenal of missiles, drones and partner militias was always the primary threat, until the US war prompted Iran to close Hormuz. The nuclear programme is lower on their list. Even so, Saudi Arabia calculated that negotiation based on a flawed foundation was better than the continuation of a bad war. It even floated the idea of a non-aggression pact with Iran.
Tehran has not responded positively to Gulf overtures because it wants to preserve its leverage before any formal negotiation. The goal is to hasten US exhaustion and retrenchment before telling its regional rivals to yield. But Iran expects more rounds of war with the US and Israel before that happens. There is very little Saudi Arabia and its partners can do other than wait for the warring parties to exhaust themselves and work to avoid a flawed settlement that undercuts Riyadh’s interests. Indeed, Donald Trump seems willing to make the Gulf states pay (sometimes literally) for his own flops. Even so, Saudi officials did not expect Trump’s latest curveball.
After years of negotiations, the US and the kingdom finally reached a landmark nuclear energy agreement that would allow enrichment on Saudi soil. A day later, Trump went on social media with a new condition: the kingdom has to normalise relations with Israel first. Saudi officials dismissed it as typical Trump puffery. Riyadh sees the Abraham Accords as unfit for current circumstances and stands by its demand for concrete steps towards Palestinian statehood. Saudi Arabia, like many Middle Eastern states, does not want to live in a US-backed Israeli-centric regional order.
The US president’s outburst demonstrated that Israeli influence can check, if not trump, Saudi ambitions. There are good reasons to scrutinise the US-Saudi nuclear deal on proliferation grounds, but Israeli objections verge on disingenuity: a nuclear-armed Israel initiated a failing war that makes the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran more likely, while working to prevent Saudi Arabia from acquiring advanced nuclear technology. It also lets Iran crow at Arab naivety and berate US hypocrisy.
All this is happening as the Saudi war with the Houthis in Yemen threatens to reignite after four years of fragile calm. After successfully disrupting maritime traffic in the Red Sea in 2024 and 2025, the Houthis resisted Iranian calls to join the war in March and instead rebuilt their military capabilities. Sensing an opportunity to blackmail the kingdom for money and de facto recognition, the Houthis are now turning up the heat, targeting energy installations and vessels. Their ultimate weapon is the disruption of Bab al-Mandab, which would block Riyadh’s crucial Red Sea exports.
Two weeks ago, Washington fast-tracked a $2bn arms sale to the kingdom consisting mainly of precision weapons. Should the war resume, Riyadh will probably demand and obtain US intelligence, targeting support and precious missile interceptors. Such is the fate of middle powers: planning for autonomy until the harsh reality of conflict compels them to call their distrusted patron.
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