The end of the Viktor Orbán era

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Every so often, an electoral result marks a turning point. The defeat of Hungary’s Viktor Orbán after 16 years is one. The constitutional majority projected for the party of Orbán’s challenger Péter Magyar is a striking blow for both Russia’s Vladimir Putin and America’s Donald Trump, and for the loose alliance of Christian populist nationalists for whom Orbán has been a standard bearer. It is positive for democracy and rule of law in Hungary, for EU decision-making, and for the future of Ukraine.

Yet celebration among opponents of the “illiberal” democracy that Orbán espoused should be tempered. Magyar emerged from the prime minister’s Fidesz party and, while pledging to stamp out corruption and promising on Monday to rebuild EU ties, still offers a toned-down version of conservative nationalism. Orbán himself, moreover, had enjoyed an extended period at Hungary’s helm. After 2010 he triumphed three more times in elections deemed “free but not fair” — meaning that although Fidesz dominated the media and electoral process, voters could still express their will.

His 16-year rule led ultimately to economic stagnation, and in recent years high inflation, with Hungary in wealth terms falling behind peers such as Poland, even if for half of that period Poland was ruled by a party that looked to Orbán’s Fidesz as a model. Fidesz’s state capture will take time to unwind, creating a further drag on the country’s progress, though Magyar’s big majority will make life easier for him than it has been for the liberal Polish government led by Donald Tusk since 2023.

Orbán’s defeat offers a nuanced lesson: under the right conditions nationalist populism can be defeated at the ballot box, though it can endure for a long time. One message for would-be Orbáns elsewhere, presenting themselves as a radical break from tired incumbents, is that they will come undone if they cannot deliver economically. Monopolising the media message can only suppress criticism for so long.

Voter disillusionment is compounded by the propensity of such regimes to spawn cronyism and corruption. Channelling money and jobs to loyalists is a good way to consolidate power, but promotes a system driven by self-interest not the public interest. Orbán argues that liberal democracy has had its day. Yet stripping away the checks and balances inherent to liberal democracy results, over time, in drift and decay.

Removing “illiberal” populists through the ballot box rather than street power, though, relies on elections taking place with sufficient freedom that the result reflects the popular will. Here, Hungary differs from some strongman regimes elsewhere — thanks to its membership of the EU. The desire of Hungarians to remain in the 27-nation bloc, and the Orbán system’s long reliance on EU funds, imposed restraints. Hungary exposed the lack of EU tools to deal with democratic backsliding by a member state. But the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism the bloc belatedly came up with, freezing €18bn of funding for Hungary, had an effect. And Budapest could not resort to outright ballot-stuffing or, like Putin’s Russia or Erdogan’s Turkey, to arresting opponents.

Populist nationalist governments elsewhere in the EU will face similar constraints, though continued membership tends to be less valued in older, wealthier members that are net contributors. One country beyond Europe whose leadership has drawn inspiration from Orbán and faces decisive elections later this year is Trump’s US. In the absence of external restraints, America will have to rely on its own institutions — the courts, Congress, and election officials at all levels — to uphold the freedom and integrity of the midterms. That is especially true under a leader who might not so readily concede defeat for his party as, thankfully, Orbán did in Hungary.