The real danger that Trump would pose for Ukraine

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What would a Trump presidency mean for Ukraine? A lot of the speculation about a potential “betrayal” of the country centres on a possible cut-off in arms supplies, linked to the acceptance of Russian annexation of chunks of Ukrainian territory.

Territory and weaponry are both key questions. But another less discussed issue is also emerging as a vital topic: Ukrainian neutrality.

Senator JD Vance, Trump’s running mate for the presidency, came out in favour of a neutral Ukraine in an interview with the New York Times in June. Vance said that his approach would be to “guarantee both Kyiv’s independence but also its neutrality . . . Neutrality is clearly something that they [the Russians] see as existential for them.”

On the surface, a neutral Ukraine sounds like an interesting option. Finland and Austria were neutral during the cold war. Both countries managed to remain democratic and outside the Soviet bloc.

However, the Biden administration remains wary of Russia’s demand for a neutral Ukraine, believing that Vladimir Putin’s ambitions would not stop there. US national security adviser Jake Sullivan told me last week: “It’s clear that what Russia wants now is a neutered Ukraine that cannot properly defend itself. He still wants to subjugate Ukraine. And we will not let that happen.”

Russian hopes to neuter Ukraine became clear in the peace proposals put forward by Moscow in 2022, early in the conflict. They insisted Ukraine should not join Nato — and that Ukraine’s army should be reduced to 85,000 troops and its number of tanks severely limited. One senior Ukrainian official recalls: “They were asking that we put our weapons into warehouses that they would guard. And for a complete veto over our foreign policy.”

There is no indication that Russia has backed down from these maximalist demands. The Ukrainians know that accepting Putin’s proposals would put their country permanently at Moscow’s mercy. But the current debate about neutrality is still interesting, because it sheds light on arguments about how to end the war in Ukraine that are taking place just beneath the surface of the public discussions.

Much of the public argument still revolves around the vital and emotive question of territory. Russia continues to insist that it will hang on to all the territory that it currently occupies — and also that Ukraine must make further troop withdrawals, followed by an international agreement that Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions are Russian territory. Ukraine continues to insist on the complete restoration of its territorial integrity, including Crimea. The US and its European allies say they will support Ukraine for “as long at it takes” and that they will not impose peace terms on the Ukrainians.

Wars are unpredictable, so a decisive battlefield breakthrough by either Ukraine or Russia remains possible. But, as things stand, it is unlikely that Kyiv will be able to take back all its territory by force of arms. The Ukrainians and their main western backers know this, even if they will not acknowledge it in public. Making territorial concessions in return for peace is gaining some support among the Ukrainian public, although it is not yet a majority position.

The biggest obstacle to peace is not Ukraine’s deep reluctance to make territorial concessions — real though that is. It is the fact that Russia would still demand a settlement that involved the subjugation of the 80 per cent of Ukraine that it did not control. The Ukrainians need assurances that Russia would not use a peace settlement to rearm and then go back on the offensive. Until they get that, there is no possibility of a serious debate in Kyiv about borders or territory.

That is why security guarantees for Ukraine would be central to any future peace talks. Kyiv’s current stance is that Ukraine must join Nato — which would mean that the country was covered by the alliance’s collective security guarantee. The most recent Nato summit declared that “Ukraine’s future is in Nato”. But it added that this will only happen “when allies agree and conditions are met”.

Admitting Ukraine to Nato, while Russia still occupies some of the country’s territory, would be tricky. West Germany during the cold war could be a model. But West German membership of Nato was backed by the stationing of significant numbers of US troops on West German soil. There is no guarantee that the US Congress would agree to deploy American troops in Ukraine.

Another idea that has powerful advocates in Washington is the “Israel option” (sometimes called the porcupine option), which would avoid a formal treaty commitment to defend Ukraine — and instead rely on building up Ukraine with advanced western military aid, so that it could deter future Russian aggression on its own.

But even the porcupine option would fall foul of Russia’s demand for a neutered Ukraine. Could Moscow’s stance change? The Russians are suffering staggering losses, estimated at over 1,000 troops killed or wounded every day.

But Putin seems to be waiting on events in America. The Biden administration will not agree to the neutering of Ukraine. But a Trump-Vance administration might. As long as the US election result remains in doubt, Putin has every incentive to keep fighting.

gideon.rachman@ft.com